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CHAPTER 8 
U.S. Aid to Hill Tribe Refugees in Laos 
JAMES T H O M A S W A R D 
INTRODUCTION 
Although this paper provides a general description of the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
Refugee Relief Program, conducted in cooperation with the 
Royal Laotian Government (RLG), its main emphasis is on a 
particular phase of the program: assistance to Meo hill tribe 
refugees in Xieng Khouang Province from 1963 to 1965. The 
opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and 
entirely his responsibility. 
BACKGROUND 
The Xingdom of Laos attained independence in 1954 as a re-
sult of the Geneva Conference. This conference, which marked 
the end of French domination in the Indochinese peninsula, also 
created the independent states of Cambodia and Vietnam. Dur-
ing the colonial period the French had set the boundaries of 
Laos for their administrative purposes. French administration 
in Laos followed the pattern of indirect rule; extensive exploita-
tion or development of the economy was not attempted, and 
little modernization was achieved. The problems of building a 
modern nation that confronted the RLG were as formidable as 
those facing any of the new nations. The creation of a sense 
of unity among the diverse ethnic, linguistic, and cultural groups 
was paramount. On top of all this was a civil war that is still 
in progress. The 1962 fourteen-nation Geneva Conference was 
an attempt to resolve the problems of internal discord that had 
escalated into a great power confrontation. The resulting treaty 
provided for a neutral, independent, and unified Laos, ruled by 
a Government of National Union composed of the Conservative, 
Neutral, and Communist-oriented Pathet Lao factions. 
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The Kingdom consists of approximately two million citizens, 
who are spread over an area of 91,000 square miles. The ethnic 
Lao, comprising only half of the total population, are generally 
found in the lowlands, especially in the Mekong River Valley. 
The elite ethnic Lao live in the cities, and they dominate the 
political, economic, and social life of the countiy; whereas the 
peasant masses live in rural viUages and practice subsistence 
paddy-rice cultivation. 
The other half of the population are hill tribes, who usually 
live in remote upland areas and practice swidden or shifting 
rice cultivation. The Lao Theng or "Kha," including the Khmu ,^ 
are Mon-Khmer-speaking groups that may antedate all the other 
inhabitants; they comprise about 25 percent of the total popula-
tion and are distributed throughout Laos, generally in the lower 
hill elevations. The remaining 25 percent are the Meo (Miao), 
Yao (Man), Upland Tai (Black, White, Red, and Lue groups), 
Akha (Ekaw), and Lahu (Mussuh). These groups are found 
in northern and central Laos, areas of widespread Pathet Lao 
insurgency. As a consequence, the large majority of refugees in 
Laos are tribal peoples who inhabit these areas. 
USAID REFUGEE RELIEF 
^^  The widespread refugee problem is caused by the protracted 
"revolutionary warfare" being waged by the Pathet Lao with 
support from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Much of the 
area of Xieng Khouang, Sam Neua, and Nam Tha provinces has 
beert occupied by Pathet Lao fighting units, and, as a conse-
quence, thousands of mountain people have been dislocated from 
their homes and rice fields. Most have sought refuge in the more 
remote mountain areas and have defended themselves against 
the aggressors. Many refugees have lost all of their household 
goods except those items which they could carry away on their 
bapks. As a humanitarian gesture, and in response to a request 
from the Prime Minister of the Lao government, USAID has 
undertaken an emergency assistance program in cooperation with 
the RLG Ministry of Social Welfare. 
By the end of 1964 over 150,000 refugees were receiving assis-
tance, primarily rice, and also other basic necessities, such as 
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clothing, blankets, cooking-pots, tools, and seed. Bccause roads 
in these remote mountain areas are almost nonexistent, 90 per-
cent of the refugee supplies are delivered by air drop. This 
amounts to a daily drop of about fifty tons. 
Of the approximately 141,500 refugees in the north, there are 
an estimated 88,000 Meo tribesmen located primarily in Xieng 
Khouang and Sam Neua provinces. Sizable numbers of Lao 
Theng refugees (26,500) are found in the northern provinces. 
There are an estimated 19,000 ethnic Lao refugees, mainly in 
Sam Neua, with others in Luang Prabang and Xieng Khouang. 
In Nam Tha Province there are approximately 6,000 Yao and 
2,000 Lue, with smaller numbers of other tribes represented. 
The remaining refugees are Lao and Lao Theng refugees who 
have gone to Vientiane or to the southern provinces of 
Khamoune, Sedone, and Attopeu. 
The total number of refugees fluctuates greatly. As fighting 
increases, the people are forced to leave their homes; they may 
be new refugees, or old refugees who had previously received 
assistance and had possibly become self-sufiBcient in food produc-
tion. As a result of the Pathet Lao 1964 spring offensive, 30,000 
new refugees were added to the rolls, oflFsetting approximately 
the same number who became self-sufficient because of a good 
harvest in other areas. Under the most ideal conditions (good 
security and a good rice crop), the 30,000 new refugees displaced 
after spring planting were expected to require support for the 
remainder of 1964 and until November 1965, when their new 
crop was harvested. 
The amount of need varies greatly from place to place. In 
locations near the fighting areas, the dependence on relief is 
much greater than in relatively secure areas. Of the total number 
of refugees at the beginning of 1965, it was estimated that by 
the end of the year probably one-third would become self-suffi-
cient, one-third partially self-sufficient (grow enough rice for 
maybe six months), and one-third completely dependent because 
of the fighting, crop failure, etc. While the immediate aim of 
the relief program has been to provide basic sustenance to hard-
pressed refugees, the long-range aim is permanent resettlement 
in secure, productive areas, in a manner that will be acceptable 
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to the tribal peoples. Since the military situation in the northern 
areas does not offer much encouragement at present, extensive 
resettlement has not been attempted there. 
AID TO MEO REFUGEES IN XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCE 
The largest number of refugees is to be found in Xieng 
Khouang Province among the Nfeo tribe. The Meo are relative 
newcomers to Laos. Most immigrated in the past century from 
China and North Vietnam. It has been estimated that there are 
between two and one-half and three million Meo people living 
in Thailand, Laos, North Vietnam, and the Chinese provinces 
of Kweichow, Kwangsi, and Yuiman. In Laos the Lao language 
is the lingua franca, and most Meo village leaders, even in the 
most remote areas, know some Lao in addition to their own 
language. 
Traditionally, the Meo have preferred mountain living. Most 
build homes in the higher elevations, explaining that they find 
it difficult to become acclimatized to valley living and paddy-rice 
cultivation. In any case, their isolation has helped preserve their 
cultural identity. Although Meo history has been characterized 
by centuries of oppression and disruption (first in China, later 
in Vietnam and Laos), the Meo have maintained a strong feeling 
of independence and a fierce resistance to their oppressors. They 
have often demonstrated that no matter how difficult their plight 
as refugees may be, they are able to overcome these disadvan-
tages. Generally speaking, the Meo have unusual initiative, 
adaptability, and an ability to organize themselves. This latter 
trait is probably based on their strong clan system. 
The Meo practice an animistic type of religion rather than 
the Buddhism that predominates among the Lao. Their Meo an-
cestors are venerated; village shamans communicate with spirits, 
disperse evil spirits, and practice medicine (see Barneys paper). 
The agriculture of the Meo depends on shifting cultivation. 
The cycle of dry-rice culture begins in February when the forest 
area of a mountainside is cleared. After the trees have been cut 
and dried, they are burned. In April or May the soil of the swid-
den is loosened and rice seeds planted. Then comes the rainy 
season, and afterwards the rice is harvested, usually in Novem-
ber. Maize is an important crop among the Meo, who also raise 
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cabbage, green beans, squash, cucumbers, turnips, sweet pota-
toes, eggplant, etc. Opium cultivation is traditional and has in 
the past served as a cash crop. Its importance has declined, how-
ever, in the past several years as good production areas have 
been lost and access to markets has been limited. In some cases 
non-refugee tribesmen who grow opium and who have a way 
of getting it to lowland market areas will trade it for consumer 
commodities—cloth, sugar, sweetened canned milk, flashlight 
batteries, etc.—either for their own consumption or for marketing 
in their own locale. Some authorities believe that in a period 
of military security, after transportation facilities make markets 
more accessible, increased vegetable production could replace 
opium in importance as a cash crop. The Meo are enthusiastic 
about hvestock production and raise cattle, pigs, horses, and 
water buffalo. In addition to animal husbandry, the Meo excel 
as blacksmiths. Most villages have at least one blacksmith, who 
is usually quite competent in making agricultural implements, 
axes, knives, and muskets. 
The center of refugee activities in Xieng Khouang Province 
is the Meo village of Sam Thong, situated in a mountain valley 
south of the Plain of Jars at an elevation of 4,000 feet. Approxi-
mately one-half of the province, particularly the lower elevations 
including the Plain of Jars, the old provincial capital, and the 
main road which connects the Plain of Jars with Vinh on the 
Gulf of Tonkin, is under Pathet Lao control. The Meo refugee 
villages are located in the mountains, which range up to 9,000 
feet. While rice is delivered by air drop, other relief requirements 
are delivered by short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft de-
signed for landing on short, rough air strips. These air strips 
have been built by the refugees. Use of aircraft is essential to 
the operation of the relief program because it is the only way 
of getting to the refugees. Relief commodities are landed at Sam 
Thong by larger aircraft, usually Caribous, and shuttled to refu-
gee locations via smaller aircraft, usually Helio Couriers. 
The USAID refugee coordinator for Xieng Khouang is Edgar 
Buell, a man with vast experience with tribal peoples in general, 
and the Meo in particular. Perhaps the secrets of BuelKs success 
have been his empathy and tirelessness. His language facility 
and agricultural background have helped his understanding of 
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local problems, and in five years with the hill people he has 
developed numerous personal contacts. He probably knows most 
of the leaders in the larger villages in the area, and he visits 
them regularly. He always travels with a Laotian counterpart, 
bringing the message of the greater community of Laos. Buell's 
efforts at assisting refugees on the village level have gained for 
him the admiration of both the tribd people and the Lao 
government. 
When reports of new refugees are received at Sam Thong, 
Buell or one of his two American assistants, with a native coun-
terpart, visit the displaced people. At this time relocation sites 
are discussed, and the headman compiles a list of the families 
and numbers of people involved. The villagers are encouraged 
to reestablish themselves quickly, to build their homes, and to 
select areas for rice cultivation. They are told that they will re-
ceive rice from the sky only temporarily, until they are able to 
harvest their own. The most pressing needs of the villagers are 
determined and commodities quickly provided. Most common 
needs are blankets, cooking-pots, clothing, and tools. Meo refu-
gees receive steel bars to fashion their own tools, which are su-
perior to "ready-made" tools. If they need clothing, they are 
furnished with black cloth to make their own. Villagers receive 
vegetable seeds to plant gardens as a means of varying their 
diets. 
Refugees are encouraged to build a school for their children, 
and they are provided v i^th school supplies and a teacher to 
help the children to learn Lao as a second language. The larger 
village schools may have several classes for several grades. The 
highest school is a groupe schohire located at Sam Thong. This 
school accepts advanced students from a number of villages and 
is supervised by the Ministry of Education. Some of the tribal 
graduates have been accepted for further study at the Lyc^e 
and Teacher Training Center in Vientiane. Mass education for 
hill people, never attempted in the past, has been enthusiastically 
received by the villagers. 
A Meo medic will visit the new refugees and treat their numer-
ous ailments with modem medication. The medic supervises the 
construction of a small dispensary, and the village elders are 
asked to select a young man to go to Sam Thong for medic 
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training. The training program consists of classroom and on-the-
job training for four months. After the medic completes the 
course, he returns to his village with medicines to care for his 
owTi people. The USAID Public Health Division supports an 
eighty-bed hospital at Sam Thong with personnel and medicines. 
Equipment for the hospital was provided by USAID and the 
Colombo Plan. Most of the hospital beds are filled with casualties 
of war or victims of malaria, malnutrition, and other ailments. 
VILLAGE CLUSTER PROGRAM 
A common problem among new nations with traditional so-
cieties is the great gap between dominant urban elites and the 
rural masses; in Laos the latter probably constitutes 95 percent 
of the population. The Pathet Lao movement is attempting to 
mobilize the niral population with the technique of "revolution-
ary warfare" that was successfully applied in North Vietnam. 
The Royal Lao Government with USAID assistance is attempting 
to influence rural areas through the Village Cluster Program 
(Khet Phatanakhane) and the Refugee Relief Program. 
The Cluster Program is a pilot rural development program 
for the lowland areas where the ethnic Lao are predominant. 
It concentrates assistance for the improvement of education, 
health, agriculture, and transportation in a complex of existing 
villages. While the location of clusters is determined by need 
for economic improvement, strategic considerations are impor-
tant, as some clusters are located on the perimeters of RLG influ-
ence. Lao provincial officials and their USAID counterparts meet 
with district or village leaders to determine the most urgent com-
munity needs—^whether they are wells, schools, access roads, 
small irrigation dams, dispensaries, or agricultural or livestock 
improvements. The multi-purpose village-level workers assisting 
the villagers are the U.N.-trained Lao Fundamental Educators 
and the young American volunteers of the International Volun-
tary Services. There is no relocation of villagers involved. Usually 
a market town is selected as cluster headquarters, the center 
for development work. In the center, depending on the villagers* 
desires, an improved school is built, a demonstration garden is 
established, and a dispensary to serve all the villages in the clus-
ter is constructed. The cluster center serves the surrounding vil-
[ 301 ] 
If- ^ , 
I ^ 
I't V-' 
tm---
W ' -
-•felr^  
LAOS: JAMES THOMAS WARD 
lages, which may number anywhere from a half-dozen to two 
dozen. This is a self-help program: the villagers contribute their 
labor, land, and local materials, while the government and 
US AID furnish advice, equipment, and other materials. The de-
gree of village cooperation and the success of the cluster depend 
on the caliber of the local leadership. It is felt that the cluster 
program has been moderately successful, and the six original 
cluster areas started in September 1963 have been expanded to 
twelve. Villagers' attitudes toward the program are not easy to 
determine, and additional research should be conducted here. 
Changed attitudes are much more important than the number 
of projects completed. 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND TRIBES 
In the northern tribal areas the authority of the central govern-
ment has been virtually nonexistent; however, this non-involve-
ment with the tribes is changing (but see Barney's chapter re-
garding Meo-Lao relationships in Xieng Khouang). The problem 
of the tribes has been one of informal discrimination by the low-
land Lao, perhaps because of cultural and economic differences. 
This has been intensified by lack of communication and transpor-
tation facilities. While the ethnic Lao feel superior to the tribes-
men, they do not view them with the same contempt reputedly 
held by the Vietnamese toward the montagnards. Two Meos 
hold high government positions in Laos. The RLG has closely 
cooperated with Touby Lyfong, formerly a government minister 
and vicei-chairman of the National Assembly, and General Vang 
Pao, Commander of the Second Military Region. Visits to the 
tribal areas by the King, the Crown Price, Prime Minister Sou-
vanna Phouma, and other government leaders have been impor-
tant. The return to Xieng Khouang Province of the civilian Lao 
Provincial Governor from exile in Vientiane is most significant. 
The.Civil War has itensified the fragmentation of the tribes. 
The Pathet Lao movement with its "War of National Liberation" 
has, in the past, successfully recruited many tribal peoples, espe-
cially among the Lao Theng, the most deprived group. Their 
propaganda appeal promises equahty and an end to oppression 
from colonialists and neo-colonialists. The Pathet Lao has empha-
sized a popular united front of all peoples rather than the autono-
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mous regions for tribal groups found in China and the Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam. The Meo have proven effective guer-
rilla fighters on both sides; in their native environs, they are 
often superior to lowland troops. While a dissident Meo leader 
named Faydang joined Prince Souphanavong in the early days 
of the Pathet Lao movement, the majority of Meo have remained 
loyal to the central government in Vientiane, probably because 
of the leadership of Touby Lyfong and General Vang Pao. The 
Refugee Relief Program has provided a vehicle for the central 
government to become directly involved with the tribal peoples. 
The central government is now in a strong position to assess 
their needs and to ofiFer relief and services to the victims of the 
fighting. Although the program has been limited in scope, it is 
hoped that tlie returns will be promising among not only Meo, 
but also Lao Theng, Yao, and ethnic Lao refugees. It is only 
through village-level contacts such as these that the Royal Lao 
Government will be able to present to the tribes a clear image 
of itself—an image that will be respected and supported. 
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